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DECRYPTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: 
APPLYING FOURTH AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES 
TO EVOLVING PRIVACY EXPECTATIONS IN 
ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGIES 
Candice Gliksberg* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A legal battle is brewing between the U.S. government and 
technology companies over whether the government has the right to 
place limits on digital security measures like encryption.1 The debate 
over encryption and government access to digital communications 
dates back decades, but for many Americans it came to the fore 
following the December 2015 terrorist attack in San Bernardino,2 
when the FBI attempted to compel the unlocking of an encrypted 
iPhone.3 At the same time, the Senate was considering legislation 
that would require technology companies and communications 
service providers to weaken their encryption technologies and 
provide the government “backdoor” access into consumer devices.4 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2018, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Comparative 
Literature, University of California, Los Angeles. I wish to thank Professor Karl Manheim for his 
guidance, encouragement, and patience, and for explaining the complexities of quantum 
computing simply. Special thanks to Professor Cadra, Sigourney Haylock, Michaela Goldstein, 
and the other editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their helpful suggestions. 
Most importantly, I would like to thank my family, especially my mother, Dina, and my brother, 
Richard, for their constant love and support. 
 1. Sarah Sorcher, The Battle Between Washington and Silicon Valley Over Encryption, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 7, 2015), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/2015 
/0707/The-battle-between-Washington-and-Silicon-Valley-over-encryption. 
 2. Alina Selyukh, A Year After San Bernardino and Apple-FBI, Where Are We on 
Encryption?, NPR (Dec. 3, 2016, 1:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016 
/12/03/504130977/a-year-after-san-bernardino-and-apple-fbi-where-are-we-on-encryption. 
 3. Amy Davidson, The Dangerous All Writs Act Precedent in the Apple Encryption Case, 
THE NEW YORKER (Feb. 19, 2016), www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/a-dangerous-all-
writ-precedent-in-the-apple-case. 
 4. See Compliance with Court Orders Act of 2016 (Discussion Draft 2016), 
https://www.burr.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/BAG16460.pdf. 
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At the core of the debate is the balance between individual privacy 
and national security.5  
The proliferation of the Internet,6 wireless communication,7 
portable electronic storage (“e-storage”), electronic commerce (“e-
commerce),8 social media,9 and cloud computing10 has changed the 
way we live and work. We send personal communications, conduct 
financial transactions, and store our personal information (images, 
videos, audio recordings, and other private data) in cyberspace. 
e-storage has not only made it possible, but commonplace, to carry 
entire photo albums, video libraries, written communications, 
address books, and the like in one’s pocket, whereas previously these 
records would only be found in the home.11 With the shift in Internet 
usage from consumption to participation,12 our interactions with 
cyberspace can reveal the most intimate details of our lives.13 Simply 
using a navigation application on your phone can reveal where you 
are, where you have been, and where you are going.14 Electronic 
safeguards such as encryption offer a way to protect this information 
from prying eyes by locking out anyone who is not authorized to 
view it.15 The government’s concern is that encryption affords the 
 
 5. The Encryption Tightrope: Balancing Americans’ Security and Privacy: Hearing Before 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong., 6 (2016) (statement of James B. Comey, Director, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation), https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/114-
78_98899.pdf. 
 6. Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 12, 2017) 
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/internet-broadband. 
 7. Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 12, 2017) http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-
sheet/mobile. 
 8. Number of Digital Shoppers in the United States Since 2009, STATISTA, https:// 
www.statista.com/statistics/183755/number-of-us-internet-shoppers-since-2009 (last visited Feb. 
6, 2017). 
 9. Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 12, 2017) http://www.pewinternet.org 
/fact-sheet/social-media. 
 10. See, e.g., Google Drive, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/drive (last visited Feb. 6, 
2017). 
 11. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491–93 (2014). 
 12. Daniel Nations, What Does ‘Web 2.0’ Even Mean? How Web 2.0 Completely Changed 
Society, LIFEWIRE (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.lifewire.com/what-is-web-2-0-p2-3486624. 
 13. See, e.g., David Nield, How to See Everything Your Browser Knows About You, 
GIZMODO (Dec. 1, 2016, 8:30 AM), http://fieldguide.gizmodo.com/how-to-see-everything-your-
browser-knows-about-you-1789550766; Geoff Duncan, 7 Ways Your Apps Put You at Risk, and 
What You Can Do About It, DIGEST TRENDS (Feb. 26, 2014, 9:22 AM), 
http://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/seven-ways-apps-put-risk-cant-really. 
 14. See Duncan, supra note 13. 
 15. Sean J. Edgett, Double-Clicking on Fourth Amendment Protection: Encryption Creates a 
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 339, 340 (2003). 
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same protection to criminal entities and terrorists.16 The very same 
encryption that protects our information from prying eyes also 
prevents detection of malicious activity by watchful eyes.17 
However, ever since the whistleblower Edward Snowden revealed 
that the National Security Agency was collecting troves of 
Americans’ communications records and hacking into the Internet 
backbone, there has been widespread mistrust of the government and 
its surveillance powers.18 Thus, any legislation proposing to regulate 
encryption will likely receive pushback and criticism from 
companies and the American public.19  
This Note addresses the possible limitations that the Fourth 
Amendment20 places on the government’s ability to regulate 
electronic security technologies, particularly limitations upon the use 
of digital encryption.21 This Note takes the position that encryption 
creates a reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s encrypted 
information, and thus, encrypted information should be afforded 
Fourth Amendment protection. Thus, if regulation effectively limits 
or eliminates the ability to encrypt a digital file, it will violate the 
Fourth Amendment’s proscription of unreasonable searches and 
seizures. Part II of this Note gives a general overview of encryption. 
Part III explains the history and contours of the Fourth Amendment’s 
warrant requirement. Part III also defines the reasonable expectation 
of privacy doctrine and provides a foundation for why the Fourth 
 
 16. See generally Going Dark: Encryption, Technology, and the Balances Between Public 
Safety and Privacy: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2015) (joint 
statement of James B. Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Sally Quillian 
Yates, Deputy Attorney General), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/07-08-
15%20Yates%20and%20Comey%20Joint%20Testimony1.pdf. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Sorcher, supra note 1. 
 19. Michael Heller, Burr-Feinstein Bill Still Looks to Force Companies to Break Encryption, 
TECHTARGET (Sept. 13, 2016), http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/news/450304183/Burr-
Feinstein-bill-still-looks-to-force-companies-to-break-encryption. 
 20. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 21. Though beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to note that restrictions and 
regulations on encrypted communications also raise First and Fifth Amendment concerns. For 
example, laws regulating the dissemination and use of encryption have been criticized as an 
unconstitutional suppression of free speech for inhibiting the free flow of ideas of people who 
wish to communicate using encrypted communications. Norman Andrew Crain, Bernstein, Karn, 
and Junger: Constitutional Challenges to Cryptographic Regulations, 50 ALA. L. REV. 869, 870 
(1999). Similarly, commentators have noted that compelling an individual to produce his or her 
encryption key may violate the Fifth Amendment Privilege against self-incrimination. Scott 
Brady, Keeping Secrets: A Constitutional Examination of Encryption Regulation in the United 
States and India, 22 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 317, 325–26 (2012). 
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Amendment’s evolution will encompass encrypted data. Part IV 
evaluates the arguments for and against encryption triggering Fourth 
Amendment protection and examines whether case law indicates a 
resolution of the matter. Part V examines the effects of the notorious 
“third-party doctrine” on encrypted communications. Part VI 
proposes that the courts should recognize encryption as a virtual-
concealment effort that creates a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the contents of encrypted files. Lastly, Part VII concludes that any 
legislation attempting to regulate virtual security measures like 
encryption should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and 
likely will receive criticism on Fourth Amendment grounds. 
II.  ENCRYPTION GENERALLY 
It is important to understand the encryption process in order to 
understand the amount of privacy and security that is afforded by this 
cyber technology. In general, the process of encryption scrambles or 
encodes the contents of a digital file, making it unreadable to any 
computer or person that does not possess the correct decryption 
key.22 Once a file has been encrypted, it can be transmitted through 
the Internet, shared with other users over a network, or left on a 
personal computer, all with the owner of the document retaining 
control over who can access the file’s contents.23 
A.  The Encryption Process 
Non-electronic based encryption can be exceedingly simplistic 
and far less sophisticated than the advanced digital encryption used 
today.24 However, its process is useful for understanding how 
encryption works. Encryption works by employing an algorithm to 
mix characters of a message with other characters or values in a 
seemingly nonsensical way.25 An algorithm can be as simple as 
substituting numbers for letters or shifting the letters of the Alphabet 
in a given direction by a given number.26 For example, with a shift of 
 
 22. See, e.g., SIMON SINGH, THE CODE BOOK: THE EVOLUTION OF SECRECY FROM MARY,  
QUEEN OF SCOTS, TO QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY 6, 11 (Anchor Books, 1999). 
 23. Edgett, supra note 15, at 342. 
 24. Ciphers, PRAC. CRYPTOGRAPHY, http://practicalcryptography.com/ciphers/caesar-cipher 
(last visited Feb. 6, 2017). 
 25. See generally Singh, supra note 22 (describing the fundamentals of encryption). 
 26. Ciphers, supra note 24. 
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1, “A” would become “B”, “B” would become “C”, and so on.27 
Thus, the word “SECRET” would be written “TFDSFU”. To decrypt 
the message, the recipient would need to know the key, in this case, 
the number of characters to shift the alphabet. Since only the 
intended recipient of the message would ordinarily know the key, 
anyone else who intercepts the message would see only unintelligible 
gibberish (“ciphertext”).28 However, since in this example there are 
only a limited number of possible shifts or combinations (e.g., 26 
letters in the English alphabet), each combination can be tested in 
turn in a short time, even by hand.29 This would be an example of a 
“brute force” attack.30  
Computer encryption works similarly, but because the 
algorithms are being executed by a computer, they can be much more 
complex. The strength of encryption is usually measured by key size, 
which in turn determines how long it would take a computer to 
decrypt the data by brute force attack (i.e., simply trying every 
possible combination in order to find the right key).31 Because 
computers process information using bits, a brute force attack could 
take millennia.32 Each bit is a unit of data that possesses a single 
binary value, either a 0 or 1 (i.e., two possibilities).33 This means that 
a 128-bit key has 2128 possible combinations, or more than 300 
decillion (300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000) 
possible combinations,34 which would take multiple supercomputers 
several millennia to crack.35 Thus, it is virtually unbreakable by brute 
force attack. 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. Ciphertext is the encrypted form of the original text and is meant to be unintelligible 
without the encryption key. The original, unencrypted text is known as plaintext. See Singh, 
supra note 22, at 11. 
 29. Id. 
 30. TONY HOWLETT, Types of Encryption, in OPEN SOURCE SECURITY TOOLS: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SECURITY APPLICATIONS (2004) (ebook), http://books.gigatux.nl/mirror 
/securitytools/ddu/ch09lev1sec1.html. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Nick Parlante & Julie Zelenski, Computer Memory: Bits and Bytes, STANFORD (Apr. 4, 
2008), https://see.stanford.edu/materials/icsppcs107/06-Computer-Architecture.pdf. 
 34. Thom Patterson, Spies Among Us: Get a Peek at Their Playbook, CNN (July 20, 2016), 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/20/us/declassified-spycraft-espionage-gear-techniques. 
 35. Edgett, supra note 15, at 343. 
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B.  The Importance of the Key 
The encryption key is a unique code that keeps a digital file 
protected. This makes the key the most important part of the 
process.36 The strength of the encryption is dependent upon the key 
and not the algorithm used to encode the file or message.37 Knowing 
the algorithm without the key is worthless because the key is the only 
thing that can decrypt the message.38 This is why decryption is 
analogized to a lock and key in the physical world.39 It is also 
important to keep the description of the encryption process in mind 
when evaluating whether or not the entire process seems to create a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, which would trigger Fourth 
Amendment protection. Analyzing case law with this framework in 
mind will demonstrate that courts may be on the path to finding that 
encrypting documents creates Fourth Amendment protection. 
III.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT SHIELD AGAINST UNREASONABLE 
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 
The Fourth Amendment states:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.40 
The amendment was adopted as a response to the English Crown’s 
use of general warrants, which allowed British officers to seize 
whomever and whatever they pleased while conducting unrestrained 
searches for evidence of criminal activity.41 This abuse of power and 
unrestricted invasion of privacy was one of the driving forces behind 
the American Revolution itself.42 It is unsurprising then, that the 
Supreme Court recognized the Fourth Amendment’s significance as 
 
 36. Id. at 344. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 41. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014); see also Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 
731, 131 (2011). 
 42. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494. 
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a safeguard against abuses by the government,43 and that our courts 
take care to uphold it.44 Because the Fourth Amendment is meant to 
restrict the government’s power to investigate its citizenry, 
governmental limitations on one’s ability to keep digital files and 
communications private should be analyzed under the Fourth 
Amendment.  
A.  The Requirement of a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
The Fourth Amendment warrant requirement is triggered 
whenever a search would infringe upon an individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.45 However, that expectation must be 
reasonable from both a subjective and objective point of view. The 
standard requires “first, that a person exhibit[] an actual or subjective 
expectation of privacy and second, that the expectation be one that 
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”46  
Because it is difficult to contest a defendant’s claim to a 
subjective expectation of privacy,47 the primary focus of the test is 
what makes an expectation of privacy objectively “reasonable.”48 An 
expectation of privacy is constitutionally “reasonable” when it is 
backed by an enforceable, extra-constitutional right to enjoin the 
government’s invasion of privacy.49 That is, the legitimacy of the 
expectation “must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, 
either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to 
understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.”50 
 
 
 43. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950). 
 44. E.g., United States v. Most, 876 F.2d 191, 200 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“We do not believe that 
strict enforcement of the fourth amendment will . . . preclude effective law enforcement. Candor 
compels us to acknowledge, however, that some crimes escape detection . . . as a result of our 
vigilant commitment to constitutional norms. Enforcement of these norms is not, on such 
occasions, a pleasant duty; but it is a duty from which judges may not shrink.”). 
 45. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 151 (1978). 
 46. 117 AM. JUR. Trials 193 §2 (2012). This two-part test was first articulated in a 
concurring opinion by Justice Harlan. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) 
(Harlan, J., concurring); see also Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (stating that the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test “has come to mean the test enunciated by Justice Harlan’s 
separate concurrence in Katz.”). 
 47. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace: Can Encryption Create A 
“Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?”, 33 CONN. L. REV. 503, 507 (2001). 
 48. Id. at 507. 
 49. Id.; see, e.g., Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143–44 n.12. 
 50. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143–44 n.12. 
50.4_GLIKSBERG_V.9-2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/23/19  7:36 PM 
772 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:765 
B.  The Effect of Concealment Efforts on the Reasonable Expectation 
of Privacy 
When a person seeks to exclude others and takes reasonable 
steps to do so, have they created a reasonable expectation of privacy? 
It is clear that they exhibit at least a subjective expectation of 
privacy.51 For example, in Florida v. Riley, a defendant growing 
marijuana on his private property attempted to ensure that no one 
knew of the illegal activity by building a fence and covering the 
marijuana so that it could not be seen from the street.52 Law 
enforcement flew a helicopter over the defendant’s property and 
viewed the defendant’s property from the public airspace above.53 
The defendant argued that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the enclosed area and that the government should have procured a 
warrant before flying over.54 The Court reasoned that although the 
defendant could have rationally expected that his fence and 
structures would create privacy, the government agents had the right 
to enter public airspace, from where they could see the marijuana in 
plain view.55 Thus, although the defendant had a subjective 
expectation of privacy in his private property, it was not one that 
society was prepared to honor.56  
Conversely, the Supreme Court has held that “the Fourth 
Amendment provides protection to the owner of every container that 
conceals its contents from plain view.”57 For example, in United 
States v. Chadwick,58 the Court determined there was a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a locked footlocker even though the 
footlocker was in public view.59 The Court reasoned that the privacy 
interest in the footlocker was not in the container itself, which was 
exposed to public view, but in its contents.60 Chadwick had the right 
to exclude others from the contents of the footlocker and employed 
the footlocker to do so. Similarly, in Bond v. United States,61 the 
 
 51. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449–51 (1989). 
 52. Id. at 445. 
 53. Id. at 448. 
 54. Id. at 451–52. 
 55. Id. at 450–52. 
 56. Id. at 449. 
 57. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822–23 (1982). 
      58.   433 U.S. 1 (1977). 
 59. Id. at 11. 
 60. Id. at 13–14 n.8. 
61.   529 U.S. 334 (2000). 
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Court reasoned that a bus passenger exhibited a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his luggage, even though it was not locked, 
“by using an opaque bag and placing that bag directly above his 
seat.”62 The Court found the opacity of the bag sufficient to satisfy 
the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test, even absent a lock, 
because the bag concealed the contents, thereby excluding prying 
eyes.63 In each instance, the Court found the concealment efforts 
were ones that society was willing to recognize as affording a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.64 It should also be noted that the 
Court explicitly refuses to recognize a constitutional distinction 
between worthy and unworthy containers, as long as they conceal 
their contents from plain view.65 
C.  Applying These Principles to Encryption 
When applied in the context of encryption and the digital world, 
these guiding principles should lead to the conclusion that encryption 
does indeed trigger Fourth Amendment protection. The sole purpose 
of encryption is to prevent unauthorized access to digital files by 
rendering them unreadable to those without the decryption key. That 
is, the purpose is to exclude and conceal. Encryption serves both to 
facilitate and protect electronic communication and the storage of, 
often personal, information. The types of data stored and transmitted 
electronically are as varied as tangible objects carried in the physical 
world. Smart phone, computer, and Internet users enjoy access to 
digital calendars,66 photographs,67 address books,68 correspondence 
in the form of e-mail messages,69 and diaries in the form of personal 
 
 62. Id. at 338–39. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11; Bond, 529 U.S. at 338–39. 
 65. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982) (noting that for purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment, “the most frail cottage in the kingdom is absolutely entitled to the same 
guarantees of privacy as the most majestic mansion,” and thus a traveler’s toothbrush and 
clothing carried in a paper bag or scarf should not be treated any differently than a “sophisticated 
executive” with a locked briefcase) (citing Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958)). 
 66. E.g., Google Calendar, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/calendar/answer 
/2465776?co=GENIE.Platform%3DDesktop&hl=en (last visited Jan. 2, 2017). 
 67. E.g., Google Photos, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/photos/about/ (last visited Jan. 
2, 2016). 
 68. E.g., Mac Basics: Address Book, APPLE (Mar. 23, 2016), https://support.apple.com/en-
us/HT201728. 
 69. See, e.g., Gmail, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en-GB/mail/help/about.html 
(last visited Jan. 2, 2017). 
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blogs70—the same materials deemed “highly personal” by the 
Supreme Court.71 The fact that the encrypted items are digital should 
not diminish the privacy interest in them; after all, the Supreme 
Court recognized in Katz v. United States that intangibles are 
covered by the Fourth Amendment,72 and in Riley v. California the 
Court recognized a privacy interest in digitally stored information.73 
Encryption is simply the means to exclusion, the affirmative step 
taken to ensure privacy, like the bag in Bond74 or the footlocker in 
Chadwick.75  
IV.  AN ANALYSIS OF EXISTING VIEWPOINTS REGARDING 
ENCRYPTION AND THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY TEST 
There are two camps of thought regarding whether encryption 
itself can trigger a reasonable expectation of privacy.76 One camp 
believes that encryption functions like a virtual container.77 The other 
compares encryption to a foreign language, arguing that the 
encrypted contents are in plain view—they must simply be 
translated.78 This section explores both views and responds to their 
various arguments. This section also examines indications from 
current case law that our judicial system may be on its way to 
recognizing that encryption creates a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.  
 
 70. E.g., About WordPress, WORDPRESS, http://wordpress.org/about (last visited Jan. 2, 
2017). 
 71. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985). 
 72. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
 73. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489, 2494–95 (2014) (deeming cell phones 
“minicomputers” that hold “the privacies of life” and stating that “the fact that technology now 
allows an individual to carry such information in his hand does not make the information any less 
worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought.”). Nor does it matter that digital 
communications are usually written, not oral, since the Court has determined that “[l]etters and 
other sealed packages are in the general class of effects in which the public at large has a 
legitimate expectation of privacy; warrantless searches of such effects are presumptively 
unreasonable.” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984). 
 74. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000). 
 75. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977). 
 76. See Crain, supra note 21, at 870 (stating that “[e]ncryption technologies serve as the 
locks and keys of cyberspace.”); Kerr, supra note 47, at 515–19. 
 77. David A. Couillard, Defogging the Cloud: Applying Fourth Amendment Principles to 
Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2205, 2231 (2009). 
 78. Kerr, supra note 47, at 515–19. 
50.4_GLIKSBERG_V.9-2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/23/19  7:36 PM 
2017] DECRYPTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 775 
A.  Arguments That Encryption Creates a Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy 
Most commentators believe encryption is the virtual equivalent 
of a lock and key or an opaque container79 because the encryption 
algorithm converts plaintext (the contents of the file) into a set of 
symbols and scrambled text that mean nothing without the 
encryption key, even if one knows the encryption algorithm.80 The 
plaintext is literally unviewable (or invisible) because it is concealed 
behind a digital ciphertext wall or barrier.81 This is virtual opacity. 
Because digital encryption works to ensure that the individual 
encrypting the file can control access with the encryption key, it 
works just like a locked container and a complete sense of privacy 
exists.82  
B.  Arguments That Encryption Does Not Create a Reasonable 
Expectation of Privacy 
Still, some respected scholars dismiss this assessment by 
pointing out that an encrypted message (or file) can still be viewed, 
albeit in encoded form.83 That is, the encrypted message itself 
remains in plain view. Thus, they contend that a law enforcement 
officer’s observation of such an encrypted message is not a search 
and does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.84 Furthermore, they 
maintain that the encrypted message, once observed, may be 
decrypted without implicating the Fourth Amendment, just as law 
 
 79. Crain, supra note 21, at 870 (stating that “[e]ncryption technologies serve as the locks 
and keys of cyberspace.”); Edgett, supra note 15, at 350–51; Couillard, supra note 77, at 2232; 
Timothy B. Lennon, The Fourth Amendment’s Prohibitions on Encryption Limitation: Will 1995 
Be Like 1984?, 58 ALB. L. REV. 467, 487 (1994); 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: 
A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.6(f), at 721 (4th ed. 2004) (quoting Randolph S. 
Sergent, Note, A Fourth Amendment Model for Computer Networks and Data Privacy, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 1181, 1200 (1995) (“protections such [as] individual computer accounts, password 
protection, and perhaps encryption of data should be no less reasonable than reliance upon locks, 
bolts, and burglar alarms, even though each form of protection is penetrable.”). 
 80. Andrew B. Berman, International Divergence: The “Keys” To Signing On the Digital 
Line-the Cross-Border Recognition of Electronic Contracts and Digital Signatures, 28 
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 125, 128 (2001) (providing a general overview of the encryption 
process and its effectiveness to protect documents); See generally Singh, supra note 22. 
 81. See Edgett, supra note 15, at 365 (“Encryption makes a document invisible to 
outsiders . . . . Instead of using physical walls, it creates a digital wall . . . .”). 
 82. Id. at 350. 
 83. Kerr, supra note 47, at 515–19; Scott Brady, Keeping Secrets in Cyberspace: 
Establishing Fourth Amendment Protection for Internet Communication, 110 HARV. L. REV. 
1591, 1604 (1997). 
 84. Brady, supra note 83, at 1604.; Kerr, supra note 47, at 515–19. 
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enforcement agents may “decode” communications they overhear in 
foreign languages or idiosyncratic terms (code words) used by street 
gangs.85 Finally, they argue that, historically, decrypting encrypted 
communications has been held not to violate a reasonable 
expectation of privacy and that conclusion does not change in the 
Internet or digital context.86  
C.  Encryption Creates a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
The above arguments suggesting encryption does not create a 
reasonable expectation of privacy fail in several respects, and this 
Note will address each in turn. First, an encrypted message’s 
contents are not in plain view; if they were, the very point of 
encryption would be defeated. An individual’s privacy interest is in 
the plaintext, or original message, which is not in plain view. 
Without the encryption key, only the ciphertext (encrypted text) is in 
plain view. Much like the locked container in Chadwick, which was 
found to trigger Fourth Amendment protection, the privacy interest is 
not in the ciphertext but in the original contents or plaintext.87 Thus, 
attempting to decrypt the ciphertext by brute force attack would be 
like the bus employee in Bond who violated Bond’s Fourth 
Amendment privacy interest by attempting to determine the contents 
of Bond’s opaque bag by feeling and squeezing it.88 
The case of Walter v. United States nicely illustrates these 
principles.89 In Walter, 12 packages were delivered to the wrong 
company and were opened by its employees.90 Inside the packages 
were several boxes of 8-millimeter film.91 On the side of each box 
“were suggestive drawings, and . . . explicit descriptions of the 
contents.”92 One employee attempted to hold some of the films up to 
the light, but was unable to observe the content of the films.93 The 
 
 85. Brady, supra note 83, at 1604; Kerr, supra note 47, at 515–19. 
 86. Kerr, supra note 47, at 532. 
 87. In Chadwick, there was not a reduced expectation of privacy in the footlocker just 
because it was in public view. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11, 13–14 n.8 (1977) 
(“Respondents’ principal privacy interest in the footlocker was, of course, not in the container 
itself, which was exposed to public view, but in its contents.”). 
 88. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000). 
 89. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980). 
 90. Id. at 651–52. 
 91. Id. at 652. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 651. 
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company contacted the FBI, who viewed the films with a projector 
without first obtaining a search warrant.94  
Although a majority of the Court concluded that the federal 
agents’ viewing of the film with a projector violated the Fourth 
Amendment, there was no majority opinion. Justice Stevens authored 
the opinion announcing the judgment of the court.95 Justice Stevens 
asserted that because the employee was unable to actually view the 
content of the films, the petitioners retained their reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their contents.96 That the descriptive labels 
on the boxes had been exposed merely “gave [the federal agents] 
probable cause to believe that the films were obscene . . . and 
offended the criminal code.”97 But because the contents of the films 
were still not known with certainty, the petitioners’ reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their contents remained intact and the 
agents needed a warrant to view them with a projector.98 The four 
dissenters in Walter believed that no real expectation of privacy 
remained in the contents of the films by the time the FBI received 
them because the descriptions on the boxes had “clearly revealed the 
nature of their contents” to the employees.99 Thus, in the dissenting 
Justices’ view, the subsequent viewing of the films by the FBI did 
not change the nature of the search and was not an additional 
search.100  
It is clear that under either Justice Stevens or the dissent’s view, 
people who encrypt their communications would maintain a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in those communications, thus  
triggering Fourth Amendment protections. Just as the contents of the 
films in Walter could not be viewed without a film projector, the 
contents (plaintext) of an encrypted message cannot be viewed 
without the encryption key. While the 8-millimeter film itself was 
 
 94. Id. at 654. 
 95. Id. at 657. Justice White, joined by Justice Brennan in a concurring opinion, believed the 
Fourth Amendment was violated because the agents had not obtained a warrant. Id. at 660–62 
(White, J., concurring). Justice Marshall also concurred in the judgment but did not write an 
opinion. Id. at 660 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 96. Id. at 659 (“The private search merely frustrated that expectation in part. It did not 
simply strip the remaining unfrustrated portion of that expectation of all Fourth Amendment 
protection.”). 
 97. Id. at 654. 
 98. Id. at 654, 659. 
 99. Id. at 663 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 100. Id. at 663–64. 
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exposed to the employee’s view, the content of the film was not. 
Similarly, even if the cyphertext is exposed to or in “plain view” of a 
third party, the original content (the plaintext) is not. Moreover, 
unlike the boxes that housed the films in Walter, encrypted 
cyphertext does not carry any descriptive information that would 
“clearly reveal” anything about the plaintext contents of the file or 
message or their “nature”. The contents of the encrypted message 
remain unknown to the police or a third party until they are 
decrypted. Thus, people should retain a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the contents of their encrypted communications.  
Second, decrypting an encrypted message is nothing like 
“decoding” idiosyncratic terms used by street gangs or 
communications in a foreign language that are overheard by officers. 
Idiosyncratic terms or “code words” used by gangs are readily 
associated with observable actions and events. The true meaning of 
the term is already technically known or presumed, it just needs to be 
proved. For example, a gang known to deal in drugs uses the word 
“shirts” to refer to cocaine. If members of the gang discuss a 
shipment of “shirts” they expect at 5:00 pm and are observed 
receiving a shipment of cocaine, then the presumption that “shirts” 
stands for drugs is simply proven. In contrast, the contents of an 
encrypted message are unknown and the key is not usually 
guessable. Moreover, a code word is known to and used by multiple 
gang members, if not the entire gang, and foreign languages, though 
foreign, are generally spoken by millions of people. Encryption does 
not work like a foreign language. One unique key is shared between 
at most two users.101 If decryption were as simple as translating a 
language, for which one can rely on general intelligence and 
education, encryption would lack the assurances of privacy that 
people rely upon in engaging in online transactions and 
communications. Furthermore, “law enforcement could conceivably 
‘figure out’ the combination to a padlock more quickly and easily 
than it could decrypt modern encryption, but that does not eviscerate 
privacy interests in a physically locked container.”102 
 
 101. Edgett, supra note 15, at 356–57 (“If individuals speaking a language unique to the two 
of them—an equivalent to encryption—then there should be a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.”). 
 102. Couillard, supra note 77, at 2235. 
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The third contention, that decrypting encrypted communications 
has historically been held not to violate a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, is somewhat misleading. None of the cases cited by one 
proponent of this argument, Professor Kerr, expressly holds that 
decryption does not violate the Fourth Amendment.103 In none of 
these cases did the litigants raise the Fourth Amendment issue,104 and 
it is not the place or duty of the courts to advocate for the parties. In 
any event, all three points fail to address the second prong of the 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test: whether an expectation of 
privacy is objectively reasonable.105  
In determining whether an expectation of privacy is objectively 
reasonable, the Court considers whether society is willing to accept 
the expectation as reasonable.106 The use of technology and the 
Internet is now commonplace. It is integrated into every aspect of our 
lives: from school and work, to banking and shopping, to socializing 
and conducting business, to paying taxes and bills. Personal 
communications, electronic diaries, trade secrets, and other personal 
data rapidly fill hard drives, network servers, and the Internet. 
Millions of people and businesses now use cloud computing to store 
data on remote servers owned by service providers instead of on their 
own hard drives because it is more cost effective and has a larger 
capacity. The proliferation of the Internet, e-commerce, and cloud 
computing would not have occurred if there were not safeguards 
protecting this data and upon which people could rely. In the digital 
world, those safeguards are limited to unlisted links, passwords, and 
encryption. Though digital protection measures are limited in 
 
 103. See, e.g., Allis v. United States, 155 U.S. 117, 120 (1894) (upholding use at trial of 
plaintext version of encrypted telegram sent by defendant because no objections were raised or 
preserved in the lower courts); Buckley v. United States, 33 F.2d 713, 716 (6th Cir. 
1929) (discussing defendant’s own voluntary testimony describing his practice of encrypting his 
telegraph messages to conceal their true meaning); Wong v. Esola, 6 F.2d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 
1925) (noting that coconspirators communicated via encrypted telegraph communications and 
that those communications coincided with the dates of their alleged illegal activities, thus the use 
of a cipher telegram was suspicious); see also United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 38 (C.C. Va. 
1807) (Marshall, C.J.) (noting that a letter was still in encrypted form and seeking to determine 
“whether the letter could be deciphered,” the court ruled that Burr’s secretary could not refuse to 
testify regarding his present knowledge of the cipher on Fifth Amendment grounds “because his 
present knowledge would not . . . justify the inference that his knowledge was acquired” before 
the message was written). 
 104. See, supra note 103, and accompanying text. 
 105. Kerr, supra note 47, at 503–07. 
 106. Id.; Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 151 (1978). 
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number, this does not mean they are not powerful. Many encryption 
products now available to consumers provide more security and 
protection to digital data than is available to most things in the 
physical world. Thus, society expects its data to maintain the same 
protection in cyberspace as it would if stored on a home computer or 
in a home safe. Indeed, society relies on this expectation of 
protection daily, with every online transaction or digital 
communication sent. 
D.  Indications from the Courts That Encryption Creates a 
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
Finally, some of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions indicate 
that our judicial system may be on its way to recognizing that 
encryption creates an expectation of privacy. In his concurring 
opinion in United States v. Jones,107 Justice Alito, writing for four 
Justices, remarked that “technology can change” an individual’s 
expectations of privacy and thus alter the calculus that courts must 
perform.108 Additionally, in her own concurring opinion, Justice 
Sotomayor emphasized that technology can disrupt the calculus so 
much that “it may be necessary to reconsider” basic Fourth 
Amendment premises.109 Similarly, in Riley v. California the Court 
noted that analogizing the digital world and processes to the physical 
world is difficult and unhelpful; an “analogue test would ‘keep 
defendants and judges guessing for years to come.’”110 In Riley, the 
Court held that the contents of cell phones cannot be searched 
without a warrant, even incident to arrest, because they differ 
qualitatively and quantitatively from physical containers in the 
amount and types of information they hold.111 Similarly, encryption 
differs quantitatively and qualitatively from physical locks and 
barriers in the amount of protection it affords. In his Riley 
concurrence, Justice Alito noted that “the Court’s broad holding 
favors information in digital form over information in hard-copy 
form,” but that he “do[es] not see a workable alternative.”112 Even 
some lower federal courts seem ready to recognize that digital 
 
    107.   132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 108. Id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 109. Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 110. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014). 
 111. Id. at 2489–92, 2495. 
 112. Id. at 2497 (Alito, J., concurring).  
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protection measures can trigger additional Fourth Amendment 
protection, even when the government already has lawful access to 
the container at issue. 
For example, in Trulock v. Freeh,113 law enforcement relied on 
the third-party consent exception to the warrant requirement to gain 
lawful access to the defendant’s computer.114 Under the consent 
exception, voluntary consent to a police search given by a third party 
with authority over the subject property makes a warrantless search 
reasonable and therefore constitutional.115 A third party has authority 
to consent to a search if that third party has either joint access or 
control for most purposes.116 In Trulock, the defendant’s live-in 
girlfriend, who had access to the defendant’s computer but not his 
password-protected files, consented to a search of the defendant’s 
property and computer.117 Among the things searched were the 
defendant’s password protected documents located in the computer’s 
hard drive.118 The court held that the search of the computer was 
valid.119 However, the Fourth Circuit found that the search of the 
password-protected files was invalid because the files carried an 
additional expectation of privacy.120  
Still, the lower courts are not in agreement. In United States v. 
Andrus,121 law enforcement used forensic software to gain direct 
access to the defendant’s hard drive, without first determining 
whether a username and password were needed.122 The Tenth Circuit 
concluded that the search of the computer was lawful, despite the 
fact that the forensic software allowed the police to bypass the 
password protection on the defendant’s computer, because the 
defendant’s father, who had apparent authority over his son’s 
computer,123 had consented to the police search.124 Although the 
court in Andrus acknowledged that the function of password 
 
    113.   275 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 114. Id. at 398. 
 115. United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 716 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 116. Id.; see also United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974). 
 117. Trulock, 275 F.3d at 398–402. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 403. 
 120. Id. 
 121. 483 F.3d 711 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 122. Id. at 713–14. 
 123. Id. at 716 (“[A] third party has apparent authority to consent to a search when an officer 
reasonably . . . believes the third party possesses [actual] authority to consent.”). 
 124. Id. at 719–22. 
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protection in the computer context is analogous to a lock on a 
physical container, it also distinguished password protection from 
physical locks because passwords are not readily apparent.125 Despite 
the analogous function, the court refused to presuppose that 
password protection is so common that a reasonable police officer 
should know that a computer is likely to be so protected.126  
Contrasting these two holdings illustrates the Supreme Court’s 
point in Riley: analogizing the digital world and digital processes to 
the physical world is difficult and unhelpful.127 
V.  THE EFFECT OF THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE ON ENCRYPTED 
COMMUNICATIONS 
Trulock and Andrus both address situations in which third 
parties had access to or control of the object of the search. In such 
situations, an expectation of privacy may no longer be reasonable. 
A.  The Third-Party Doctrine 
Under the “third-party” doctrine, which developed from a line of 
“third-party cases” decided by the Supreme Court, information that is 
voluntarily revealed to third parties does not warrant Fourth 
Amendment protection.128 It should be noted, however, that the mere 
ability of a third-party intermediary to access the contents of a 
communication is not sufficient to extinguish a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.129 “Nor is the right of access.”130 In Katz, for 
example, telephone companies had both the ability and right to 
monitor calls, yet the Supreme Court found that the defendant had a  
reasonable expectation of privacy during a telephone call he made 
from a public phone booth.131 Likewise, letters and other sealed 
 
 125. Id. at 718–19. 
 126. Id. at 721. 
 127. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014). 
 128. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s 
Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1210 (2004) (“The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly held, however, that the Fourth Amendment does not protect information revealed to 
third parties.”); see also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976); United States v. 
White, 401 U.S. 745, 749, 754 (1971). 
 129. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286–87 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 130. Id. at 287. 
131. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 
746–47 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (noting that telephone conversations such as the one at 
issue in Katz “must be electronically transmitted by telephone company equipment, and may be 
recorded or overheard by the use of other company equipment”). 
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packages carry with them the sender’s expectation of privacy,132 
despite the fact that they are handed over to numerous mail carriers 
and are exposed to the risk that any mail handler “could tear open the 
thin paper envelopes that separate the private words from the world 
outside.”133  
Conversely, individuals assume the risk that the third party to 
whom they convey information may subsequently reveal that 
information to the government when that information is “voluntarily” 
turned over or “knowingly exposed” to a third party.134 This 
“voluntary act of disclosure invokes the third-party doctrine, which 
gives the government additional leeway in obtaining . . . private[] 
information.”135 When third-party intermediaries are involved, the 
third-party doctrine holds that certain transactional aspects of the 
communication may be lawfully obtained from the intermediary.136 
The Supreme Court has held that transactional data are part of the 
intermediary’s business records. 137 Rather than merely holding the 
documents as a neutral third party, the intermediary is in fact an 
interested party to the transaction.138 Thus, the Court reasons that an 
individual turns the data over to an intermediary with the knowledge 
that they will not remain completely private.139 Current law holds 
that accounting firms are parties to tax records, banks are considered 
parties to the bank records of their customers, mail couriers are 
parties to the addresses on the outside of envelopes, and a telephone-
service provider is considered a party to the numbers dialed.140  
 
 132. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984). 
 133. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 285. 
 134. See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (finding that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the 
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection”); 
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 
1978) (“To the extent an individual knowingly exposes his activities to third parties, he 
surrenders Fourth Amendment protections . . . ”). 
 135. Sarah Wilson, Compelling Passwords from Third Parties: Why the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments Do Not Adequately Protect Individuals When Third Parties Are Forced to Hand 
Over Passwords, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 15 (2015). 
 136. Couillard, supra note 77, at 2227. 
 137. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440–41 (1976) (citing Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. 
Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 48–49, 52 (1974)). 
 138. Id. 
 139. See, e.g., Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335–36 (1973). 
 140. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (dialed telephone numbers); Miller, 
425 U.S. 435 (1976) (bank records); Couch, 409 U.S. 322 (1973) (business and tax records); 
Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 905–06 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[I]ndividuals do 
not enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in what they write on the outside of an envelope.”). 
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For example, in Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that 
law enforcement’s use of a pen register141 to record the numbers 
dialed from the defendant’s home telephone did not constitute a 
search.142 The Court concluded that the defendant did not have the 
requisite expectation of privacy to support a Fourth Amendment 
claim.143 The Court reasoned that callers can have no expectation of 
privacy in numbers they dial because people “realize that they must 
‘convey’ phone numbers to the telephone company since it is 
through the telephone company switching equipment that their calls 
are completed.”144 The Court emphasized that telephone users place 
calls with the understanding that telephone companies keep records 
of numbers dialed “for a variety of legitimate business purposes.”145 
According to the Court, “a person has no legitimate expectation of 
privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties,”146 
and as such, an expectation of privacy in dialed phone numbers is not 
one society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.147 Thus, whether 
an expectation of privacy is “one that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable”148 is dependent, at least in part, on whether 
information is voluntarily conveyed and knowingly used.149 
B.  Third Parties and Expectations of Privacy in Cyberspace 
What does this mean in today’s digital world, where the content 
of a communication is itself turned over to the service provider in 
order to be sent?150 Or in the cloud-computing world, where e-mails, 
photos, calendars, and other documents are turned over to cloud 
service providers for remote storage?151 For the purposes of this 
Note, a simplified understanding of the Internet and e-mail will 
 
 141. A pen register is defined as “a device or process which records or decodes dialing, 
routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument . . . from which a wire 
or electronic communication is transmitted, provided . . . that such information shall not include 
the contents of any communication . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2012). 
 142. Smith, 442 U.S. at 745–46. 
 143. Id. at 745. 
 144. Id. at 742. 
 145. Id. at 743. 
 146. Id. at 743–44 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–44 (1976)). 
 147. Id. at 743. 
 148. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)). 
 149. Wilson, supra note 135, at 16. 
 150. Kerr, supra note 128, at 1209–10. 
 151. Eric Griffith, What Is Cloud Computing?, PC MAG. (May 3, 2016), 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2372163,00.asp. 
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suffice. The Internet is a global network of computer networks.152 An 
Internet user typically has a network account consisting of a block of 
computer storage that is owned by a service provider, such as Time 
Warner Cable.153 When we use the Internet, we communicate with 
and through those remote computers to contact other computers.154 
When we write an e-mail message on an e-mail client (e.g., Gmail), 
both the message text (in binary code) and the recipient’s e-mail 
address are turned over to the service provider, which must 
necessarily have access to the contents of the message in order to 
send it.155 The service provider then routes the message through 
various networks of computers until it reaches the intended 
recipient.156 Thus, every network system through which the message 
travels could access its content.157 Because routing is dependent upon 
current traffic, nobody could know which systems these will be. The 
sender knows, however, that his or her Internet Service Provider 
(“ISP”) has (and requires) access, as does the recipient’s ISP.158 For 
this reason, commentators have argued that in the cyberspace and 
Internet context, Fourth Amendment doctrines afford little 
protection.159 
C.  The ECPA and SCA Purportedly Address the Third-Party 
Problem in Cyberspace 
To address the “dramatic changes in new computer and 
telecommunication technologies”160 and the consequences of those 
technologies for privacy and Fourth Amendment protection, 
Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act161 
 
 152. Rus Shuler, How Does the Internet Work? (last updated 2002), https://web.stanford.edu 
/class/msande91si/www-spr04/readings/week1/InternetWhitepaper.htm. 
 153. Kerr, supra note 128, at 1209. 
 154. Id. 
 155. How Email Works, RUNBOX, https://runbox.com/email-school/how-email-works/ (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2017). 
 156. See Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational 
Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L. REV. 507, 522–24 (2005). 
 157. Id. at 523. 
 158. Id. at 523–24. 
 159. See generally Kerr, supra note 128 (explaining why it may be difficult under current 
Fourth Amendment doctrine to offer strong privacy protections online); Jim W. Ko, The Fourth 
Amendment and the Wiretap Act Fail to Protect Against Random ISP Monitoring of E-Mails for 
the Purpose of Assisting Law Enforcement, 22 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 493 
(2004). 
 160. S. Rep. No. 99-541 (1986). 
 161. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012). 
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(“ECPA”) in 1986. The ECPA was meant to amend the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968, often called the Wiretap 
Act.162 The Wiretap Act, as originally drafted, proscribed the 
unauthorized interception of oral and wire communications such as 
telephone calls.163 The ECPA extended restrictions on government 
wiretaps from telephone calls to include real-time interception of 
transmissions of electronic data by computer, such as e-mails.164 
Title II of the ECPA, known as the Stored Communications Act 
(“SCA”), addresses the voluntary and compelled disclosure of stored 
communications and transactional records held by third-party service 
providers.165 Section 2702(a) of the SCA generally bans voluntary 
disclosure by service providers of content as well as non-content 
records to any government entities, except when certain narrow, 
limited exceptions apply.166  
D.  The Content versus Non-Content Distinction 
As illustrated above, the SCA distinguishes content information 
from non-content information.167 This is likely for reasons that most 
people find intuitive: the contents of messages generally implicate 
greater privacy concerns than information about those 
communications.168 The functional role of the distinction to a 
communications network may also explain the different treatment the 
two categories receive under the SCA.169 Content information is the 
communication that an individual wishes to share only with the 
intended recipient.170 In contrast, non-content information 
(sometimes referred to as “envelope” information) is information 
about the communication that the service provider or network uses to 
 
 162. Pub.L. 90-351, Title III, § 802, June 19, 1968, 82 Stat. 212. 
 163. Ko, supra note 159, at 512. 
 164. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2521 (2012). 
 165. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012). 
 166. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a), (b)(5)–(8). A provider can disclose contents when: disclosure is 
needed to protect the provider from unauthorized use of the network; a provider discovers images 
of child pornography that the provider must disclose to the police by federal law; the provider 
inadvertently discovers evidence that relates to a crime, and; when disclosure is necessary given a 
dangerous emergency. 
 167. See id. § 2703(a)–( b) (compelled disclosure of content information); id. § 2703(c) 
(compelled disclosure of non-content information); id. § 2702(b) (voluntary disclosure of 
contents); id. § 2702(c) (voluntary disclosure of non-content records). 
 168. Kerr, supra note 128, at 1228. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
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deliver and process the content information.171 Under the SCA, 
“contents” include “any information concerning the substance, 
purport, or meaning of [a] communication.”172 This clearly covers 
the body of electronic communications such as e-mails, that is, the 
actual text of the message.173 It also arguably covers the subject line 
of the e-mail, since the subject line generally carries a substantive 
message.174 It does not cover e-mail to/from addresses, for example, 
because the service provider needs this information to route 
communications.175 
The content versus non-content distinction was also drawn by 
the Supreme Court in Smith v. Maryland. There, the Court noted that 
law enforcement’s use of a pen register differed significantly from 
the listening device used in Katz because pen registers “do not 
acquire the contents of communications.”176 The court also noted that 
a pen register does not reveal who was on either end of the line or 
whether the call was even completed.177  
E.  The Effect of the ECPA and the Content versus Non-Content 
Distinction on Encryption 
Especially in light of the distinction between content and non-
content information, encryption should trigger Fourth Amendment 
protection. If the law already acknowledges that contents that are 
knowingly exposed to service providers deserve privacy protections 
under the ECPA, then contents that are concealed using digital 
security measures like encryption should be entitled to additional 
protection under the Fourth Amendment. In Smith v. Maryland, the 
Court noted that the defendant could not preserve the privacy of the 
number he dialed because, regardless of his attempts to keep the 
conversation private, he had to convey the number to the telephone 
company if he wished to complete his call.178 The fact “that he dialed 
the number on his home phone made no conceivable difference, nor 
 
 171. Id. 
 172. See 18 U.S.C. § 2711(1); 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8). 
 173. Kerr, supra note 128, at 1228. 
 174. Id. 
 175. In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 611 (5th Cir. 2013); United States 
v. Forrester, 495 F.3d 1041, 1048–49 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 176. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) (emphasis added). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 743. 
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could any subscriber rationally think that it would.”179 Conversely, 
encrypting a file or message before sending it renders it unreadable 
to the service provider and others without the decryption key. 
Nevertheless, the message or file can still be processed by the third-
party service provider and routed to its intended recipient in its 
encrypted, ciphertext form. In this way, encrypting the contents of a 
message is very much like putting a letter in an envelope. The 
message can be conveyed to a third-party intermediary without 
revealing its contents. 
Yet it was not the content versus non-content distinction that 
ultimately made the difference in the outcome of Smith v. Maryland; 
the deciding factor was whether the defendant’s expectation of 
privacy in the dialed numbers was one that society was prepared to 
recognize as reasonable.180 Thus, while the government can utilize 
the ECPA to compel disclosure of content information and contents 
of communications, most courts have nevertheless recognized that 
there is both a subjective and objective expectation of privacy in the 
contents of e-mails, and therefore afforded e-mails Fourth 
Amendment protection.181 E-mails contain the contents of an 
individual’s business and personal life, and it is highly unlikely that 
individuals “expect[] them to be made public.”182 Like the telephone 
user, an e-mail user is “entitled to assume that the words he utters 
into [a device] will not be broadcast to the world.”183  
Given the fundamental similarities between e-mail and other 
traditional forms of communication, like the telephone and the letter, 
it would “defy common sense to afford e-mails less protection.”184 
Such recognition by courts demonstrates the current understanding of 
 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See, e.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 284–86 (6th Cir. 2010); In re 
Application for Search Warrants for Info. Associated with Target Email Address, No. 12-MJ-
8119-DJW, 2012 WL 4383917, at *5 (D. Kan. Sept. 21, 2012) (holding that “an individual has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in emails” and that the Fourth Amendment protections apply to 
email); Matter of the Search of Info. Associated with [redacted]@mac.com that is Stored at 
Premises Controlled by Apple, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2014) (noting the “obvious 
expectation of privacy e-mail account holders have in their communications”); United States v. 
DiTomasso, 2014 WL 5462467, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2014) (No. 14-CR-160SAS) (holding 
that defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mails but waived this Fourth 
Amendment protection by agreeing to AOL’s terms of service). 
 182. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 284. 
 183. Wilson, supra note 135, at 13 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967)). 
 184. Id. (quoting Warshak, 631 F.3d at 285–86). 
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society’s expectations in relation to electronic communication 
technologies. After all, having been enacted more than twenty years 
before Apple released the first iPhone in 2007, the ECPA and SCA 
are vastly outdated by the current state of electronic communication 
technology.  
VI.  COURTS SHOULD RECOGNIZE VIRTUAL-CONCEALMENT EFFORTS 
TO STANDARDIZE PRIVACY APPRAISALS IN DIGITAL CONTEXTS 
The use of encryption to protect communications in transit or to 
secure data stored on a hard drive or remote server has become 
common practice.185 Indeed, tech companies and service providers 
tout their encryption technologies in order to attract customers.186 
Given the pervasiveness of encryption, its effectiveness as an 
electronic security measure, and society’s reliance upon it, courts 
should recognize that the use of encryption to protect the privacy of 
digital files and communications creates a reasonable expectation of 
privacy under the Fourth Amendment—one that society has already 
demonstrated it is willing to recognize. 
Furthermore, given the difficulty and futility of comparing 
digital technologies to physical-world analogues, courts should 
follow the advice of the Supreme Court in Riley. That is, courts 
should not analogize digital technologies to the physical world,187 but 
should instead look to the qualitative and quantitative differences or 
effects of a particular technology and its current use in our society.188 
Thus, courts should acknowledge that, although encryption is one of 
a limited number of security options in the digital context, its 
function is to protect the privacy of digital contents. Courts should 
also acknowledge that encryption differs qualitatively and 
quantitatively from physical-world security measures. Because it 
would take an unauthorized user millennia to determine a decryption 
 
 185. See Our Approach to Privacy, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/privacy/approach-to-
privacy (last visited Feb. 6, 2017); End-to-End Encryption, WHATSAPP, 
https://www.whatsapp.com/faq/en/general/28030015 (last visited Feb. 6, 2017); Making End to 
End Encryption Easier to Use, GOOGLE (Jun. 3, 2014), https://security.googleblog.com 
/2014/06/making-end-to-end-encryption-easier-to.html. 
 186. See Our Approach to Privacy, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/privacy/approach-to-
privacy/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2017); End-to-End Encryption, WHATSAPP, 
https://www.whatsapp.com/faq/en/general/28030015 (last visited Feb. 6, 2017). 
 187. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014). 
 188. Id. at 2489–92. 
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key, current encryption standards are virtually unbreakable.189 One 
“could conceivably ‘figure out’ the combination to a padlock more 
quickly and easily than [one] could decrypt modern encryption, but 
that does not eviscerate privacy interests in . . . physically locked 
container[s].”190 
By recognizing that the use of digital encryption affords a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, the courts will prevent legislation 
that would allow law enforcement to use a technological backdoor to 
avoid Fourth Amendment limitations. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Nevertheless, whether encryption itself triggers Fourth 
Amendment protection has not yet been addressed by the Supreme 
Court. The current state of the law allows law enforcement to create 
a copy of lawfully obtained digital files in their encrypted form, after 
which the government is free to attempt decryption without an 
additional warrant.191 Moreover, the argument for encryption 
triggering Fourth Amendment protection only has merit if the 
encryption key is privately held or generated by the user (i.e., is not 
known to or held by the service provider). For example, Gmail, 
which provides encryption to protect communications in transit from 
hackers, also retains the encryption keys in order to scan a user’s 
e-mails to deliver relevant advertisements to the user.192 Under 
CALEA,193 an amendment to the ECPA, service providers must 
provide the contents in decrypted form if they have access to the 
customer’s encryption key. For this reason, companies like Apple, 
WhatsApp, and Proton Mail use encryption models that purposely 
put the keys beyond the company’s reach and solely in the user’s 
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SOCIETY 63 (Kenneth W. Dam & Herb S. Lin eds., National Academy Press 1996) (describing 
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 191. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(B) (2016); Kerr, supra note 47, at 518. 
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control.194 Even if served with a warrant, these companies could not 
disclose the plaintext, only the ciphertext.  
Because more and more companies are consciously moving 
toward this standard of encryption, CALEA is no longer helpful. 
Such service providers can only be compelled to provide ciphertext. 
Thus, even if the government first obtains a warrant to seize files or 
the “container” on which the files are located and is free to decrypt 
those files, current levels of encryption still pose a serious 
impediment to law enforcement. The FBI itself has stated that our 
law enforcement lacks the resources and technical ability to crack 
such encryption.195 One company, however, has begun selling 
quantum computers196 to cybersecurity agencies and law 
enforcement in an effort to combat the “unhackable” encryption 
strategies in use today.197 Quantum computers can run computations 
in a coffee break that would take a supercomputer of today millions 
of years.198 In response, the technology community is developing 
quantum encryption,199 leading to an all-out crypto arms race.200 For 
these reasons, legislation regulating encryption has been proposed.201 
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Nevertheless, for the reasons discussed in this Note, any attempt at 
regulation should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and will 
likely receive criticism on Fourth Amendment grounds. 
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